Development of recommendations for the protection of acoustic information in meeting rooms. Part 1.

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Company managers at various levels are constantly concerned about protecting confidential information. One issue is ensuring the confidentiality of negotiations whose content outsiders do not necessarily need to know.
Let’s look at this issue in more detail.
First, a suitable venue for negotiations must be chosen. There are three options: a venue you offer, a venue offered by your partner, and neutral territory.
It is clear that, during confidential negotiations on neutral territory—whether an apartment, restaurant, hotel, sauna or another venue—nobody is responsible for information leaks. This makes that option unacceptable, unlike the first two options. Conducting conversations through various means of communication is dangerous because they can be intercepted.
The single safest option remains: equipping a meeting room on your own premises. If that is not possible, you can use such a room provided by partners you trust.
It is better to choose a room without windows, to prevent information being extracted from the room’s glass surfaces and data being transmitted by radio through the glass. If no windowless rooms are available, window-shielding measures and noise (vibration) generators can be used.
Metal blinds should also be installed. In addition to these recommendations, it is advisable to screen all surfaces in meeting rooms. This procedure weakens the electromagnetic field of radio sources located inside the premises. High-quality shielding of the premises can provide a zone of radio silence with a high degree of probability. Various materials can be used for shielding. For example:

 Nedeštruktívne Technoogie ktoré nikde nekúpiš. 

  • special metallized fabrics or films can be used to shield windows;
  • shielding paint, fabric or metal can be used to shield walls, floors and ceilings;
  • shielding fabrics or special doors can be used to shield doors.
    The final option for the so-called “sterilization of the room” is a check for hidden “bugs” in the conference room: devices that capture, record and transmit information through various channels.

Analysis of the protected facility.

Analysis of the designated room

The types and level of information-security threats in a meeting room depend on its location and architectural design, the form in which information is presented during meetings, and the types of radio and electrical equipment located in the room.
To identify threats, the room’s structural and spatial models must therefore be considered. The structural model describes the main elements of the room that affect information security: doors, windows, the thickness of walls and ceilings, radio and electronic equipment, telephone and other communication lines, power cables and other elements.
The spatial model describes the room’s location along the corridor and on the floor, and the orientation of its windows relative to possible external positions of an attacker’s technical equipment.
Access control
It is necessary to pay particular attention to who enters and leaves the meeting room. It is recommended that access be limited to 2–3 people, after checking their backgrounds and so on, so that only they can access the meeting room.
A company can usually implement three levels of protection for its premises:
LEVEL 1 Perimeter control
LEVEL 2 Access control and restrictions
LEVEL 3 Preliminary sweep of the premises
Monthly or weekly sweeps can then be carried out using a detection kit.

Eavesdropping protection systems are designed to prevent intentional and deliberate attempts to intercept private and confidential conversations. Your information is safe: www.technika.sk

Analysis of potential threats and information-leakage channels

The possibility of information leaking from a meeting depends on many factors, the main ones being:

  • the ability of attackers to establish information-leakage channels;
  • the conditions for establishing intelligence contact through a particular information-leakage channel.
    A confidential-information leakage channel is a physical path from the source of a trade secret to an attacker or competitor, through which unauthorized access to restricted information can be obtained. Establishing an information-leakage channel requires certain energy, spatial and time conditions, together with appropriate technical equipment for receiving and recording information. The main threats to information security during a meeting are:
  • eavesdropping and unauthorized recording of speech information using concealed devices, laser eavesdropping systems, stethoscopes and voice recorders;
  • recording in an uncontrolled area using radio microphones carried by participants acting as agents;
  • interception of electromagnetic emissions produced during the operation of sound recorders and electrical appliances.
    Information-security threats such as modification and destruction are not relevant in this case.
    Acoustic information can leak through doors, windows, walls, floors, ceilings and central-heating radiators.

Eavesdropping by technical means.

A large number of concealed devices are now widely used. Before eavesdropping begins, these devices are installed in the premises by intruders or by employees of the organization involved in the process. This is done when entering the room at a time when the attacker is left alone. Cleaning the premises, repairing radio equipment and similar activities can serve as pretexts.
The technical equipment used to intercept information through the acoustic channel can be classified as follows:

  • radio bugs;
  • microphones, including directional microphones;
  • voice recorders carried on the bodies of those present;
  • laser eavesdropping systems.
    The most common method of unauthorized access to confidential information uses concealed radio devices, or radio bugs. The simplest radio bugs consist of three main components:
    • a microphone, which determines the radio bug’s area of acoustic sensitivity;
    • a radio transmitter, which determines its operating range and how covertly it operates;
    • a power supply, which determines how long it operates.
    There are two types of radio bugs according to their intended purpose:
    • acoustic devices, which are mainly sensitive to airborne sound vibrations and are intended to pick up speech or sound signals;
    • contact or vibration devices, which convert vibrations caused by sound or mechanical action in various solid structures into electrical signals.
    Installing microphone bugs in a conference room is quite difficult because there are no large interior objects in the room that could be used to conceal such devices. Installing them also requires some time and the absence of unauthorized people from the room.
    Radio eavesdropping devices are easier to install and generally take up less space than microphone bugs. They can also be installed while unauthorized people are present in the room. Radio bugs can be placed in a desk drawer, a chair leg, gaps in a suspended ceiling, under the carpet in a corner of the room, or in a flowerpot.
    Alongside the methods mentioned above, there is a relatively simple and reliable method: eavesdropping using an ordinary domestic or a special voice recorder.
    In this case, an attacker participating in the meeting brings a voice recorder and switches it on during the meeting. The simplest solution would be to search every participant and their belongings. This is not possible, however, for aesthetic and diplomatic reasons. It is therefore advisable to use technical equipment that can remotely detect operating acoustic-recording equipment: a voice recorder is also a source of compromising signals.

An attacker may also remotely install a radio transmitter during the meeting.
Laser eavesdropping is a relatively new eavesdropping technology. A laser microphone makes it possible to listen to a room remotely through vibrations in its window glass. These vibrations modulate a laser beam reflected from the glass surface and falling on a photodetector, for appropriate conversion and decoding by electronic equipment. The first examples were adopted by American special services back in the 60s. The laser beam reflected from the glass of the room where negotiations take place is modulated at the sound frequency. The reflected beam received by the photodetector is reflected, and the sound is amplified and recorded. The receiver and transmitter are separate, with an interference-compensation unit. All the equipment is housed in a case and has its own power supply; it can be positioned in a building facing the room’s windows.
Acoustic signals from people speaking in the room, and from the playback of sound recordings, can be transmitted outside it through heating pipes and the structures of the room and building.
Information is obtained using stethoscopes. Intercepting compromising signals is a widespread eavesdropping method. As in any other workroom, the room contains enough equipment and devices that can be sources of compromising signals.
Electronic devices and systems in the conference room that are potential sources of compromising signals include:
• the sound-insulation system for conference rooms and meeting rooms;
• audio-recording equipment;
• technical equipment for security and fire-alarm systems; * power-supply equipment.

Compromising signals are intercepted using receivers for such signals. Ordinary domestic and specialized receivers for radio and electrical signals, selective voltmeters, scanning receivers and selective low-frequency amplifiers can also be used.
Speech can be intercepted through open windows or vents using highly directional microphones. There are several versions of these microphones, which pick up and amplify sound arriving from only one direction while attenuating all other sounds.
Miniature automatic tape recorders can be used for covert recording in a meeting room. They differ from commonly used small tape recorders in having a lower tape-drive speed and the ability to switch on automatically when sound signals appear.
There are several ways of obtaining information without authorization through the acoustic channel. The acoustic and vibration channels that can form during a meeting therefore require thorough study so that effective measures can be developed to block them.
A meeting with representatives of outside organizations should take place with the director’s approval. The director, in turn, appoints the person responsible for organizing it.
Together with security-service representatives and the relevant technical specialists, the responsible person implements the necessary organizational and technical measures to keep the matters under discussion confidential.
The order in which matters submitted to the meeting are considered should exclude people who are not involved in the matters being discussed. The responsible person should prepare a draft agenda and a participant list containing surname, first name, surname, workplace, position and the matters in which each person may participate. Participants may attend according to these lists after presenting their identity documents.
Measures to protect information during meetings with representatives of outside organizations focus on preparing suitable premises and preventing information leaks from them, taking the particular features of the meeting into account.
It is appropriate and reasonable to apply the following organizational measures:

  1. before the meeting, the premises should be visually inspected to identify concealed devices. The inspection should be systematic and careful, paying attention to every apparently insignificant detail: unfamiliar objects, domestic appliances or interior furnishings. If possible, it should be carried out by a security-service employee and a person familiar with the room’s normal surroundings, such as a security-service employee.
  2. immediately before the meeting, security staff should check the rooms adjoining the meeting room for employees or unauthorized people who could eavesdrop directly through the ventilation system or through the wall using special equipment; these rooms should be closed throughout the meeting and access to them monitored.
  3. the number of people participating in confidential negotiations should be kept to a minimum;
  4. unauthorized people should be prohibited from entering during the meeting;
  5. security arrangements for the designated room during negotiations, and monitoring of the situation on the floor, should be clearly established. During a closed meeting, outsiders or employees of the organization must not be allowed to approach the room’s door. An attacker standing outside or near the door can overhear what is being said inside. This is particularly likely when someone enters or leaves, because speech intelligibility increases dramatically while the door remains open. A person entering or leaving may also fail to close the door completely, again increasing speech intelligibility. To implement this measure, a guard must remain on duty at the door throughout the meeting, monitoring the door and the corridor near the entrance and ensuring that no outsiders enter.
  6. For greater reliability, the guard on duty at the room’s door should be a permanent employee of the organization, because this duty itself creates an opportunity for the guard to eavesdrop. 6. if possible, schedule meetings outside working hours;
  7. any work in the room outside confidential meetings—for example cleaning, repairing domestic appliances or minor cosmetic repairs—must be carried out in the mandatory presence of a security technician. This person’s presence helps protect the room against eavesdropping devices being installed by employees or unauthorized people, such as electricians, workers or cleaners.
  8. after the meeting, the room should be carefully inspected, closed and sealed;
  9. Between meetings, the responsible person must keep the room closed and sealed. The keys must be handed to the security shift on duty at reception and stored in the security room, with access regulated by management.
  10. These organizational measures for protecting information in a meeting room are considered highly effective and do not entail significant material costs or staffing problems. They can be used separately or together, significantly increasing the level of information protection at the facility in question.
  11. Technical measures for protecting acoustic information in the meeting room.
  12. To ensure complete security of acoustic information during meetings in the organization under consideration, the following proposed recommendations must be applied as an integrated set.
  13. The following channels through which acoustic information can leak from the meeting room under consideration can be identified:
  1. window;
  2. walls;
  3. floor and ceiling;
  4. door;
  5. Central-heating radiator.
    Acoustic protection of a meeting room is especially important because acoustic information is considered the most confidential information during a meeting.
    A combination of active and passive measures is used to protect speech information:
  6. energy concealment: sound insulation of the acoustic signal; sound absorption by acoustic waves; interference with the acoustic signal; noise in the room or solid medium propagating through other broadband sounds that mask acoustic signals.
  7. detection, localization and removal of concealed devices.
    Passive protection methods
    Passive methods include sound insulation and shielding.
    Reducing speaking volume during a meeting is not appropriate, so sound insulation, sound absorption and acoustic interference should be used to protect this information.
    Sound insulation confines acoustic-signal sources to an enclosed space—in this case, the meeting room. Its main requirement is that, outside the room, the signal-to-noise ratio must not exceed the maximum permissible values that prevent intruders from obtaining information.
    For the facility under consideration, the door and window openings must be soundproofed, and sound-insulating coatings must also be used.
    Windows and doors are the room’s weakest elements. Compared with other enclosing structures, doors have a much lower surface mass density and gaps and cracks that are difficult to seal. Standard doors do not meet the requirements for protecting the room’s information against eavesdropping. Doors with improved sound insulation should therefore be used, with additional gaskets around the entire perimeter of the entrance. Gaskets increase door sound insulation by 5–10 dB. As doors are used, however, the rubber seals wear, deteriorate and harden. These factors compromise sound insulation.

To protect information at the facility under consideration, it is therefore recommended to use specially designed soundproof doors or double doors with a vestibule. It is also advisable to use heavier door panels, cover them with layers of cotton wool or felt, and use additional gaskets, sealing rolls and similar materials. When creating door vestibules, sound insulation is improved by sealing gaps above the floor where there are no thresholds, and by lining the vestibule’s internal surfaces with sound-insulating coatings.
Windows, which occupy a substantial part of the enclosing structures to provide the required lighting, are, like doors, elements of the medium through which potential information-leakage channels propagate.
The data above show that the sound insulation of single glazing is comparable to that of a single door and is insufficient to protect the room’s information reliably. To increase sound insulation, it is therefore reasonable to use glazing in separate frames with an air gap of more than 200 mm, or combined triple glazing.
Besides windows and doors, acoustic information can leak from the room through heating radiators and ventilation. Screens must be installed at the ventilation openings. A screen made, for example, from aluminium and lined inside with foam should be several centimetres larger than the vent and installed 10 cm away from the opening.
To prevent information leaking through heating systems, radiator shielding must be used. The screens are mainly made from aluminium and covered with a layer of foam or another insulating material.
Sound insulation in the room can be improved by using sound-absorbing materials.
To achieve the greatest efficiency in reducing the level of the compromising signal, acoustic treatment should cover at least 60% of the room’s surface area. It is therefore best to use foam panels, with a 3 mm gap, to protect the room.
For more reliable information protection, it is recommended to install a suspended ceiling with foam panels.
In addition to the passive methods discussed above, active methods such as special noise generators should be used.
In general, practical experience shows that using the described noise generators does not impair working comfort in the room they protect. According to specialists, however, complete working comfort is provided by a vibroacoustic protection system that allows the interference signal to be adjusted optimally. The interference-spectrum adjustment system, or equalizer, included in the system ensures that the interference level exceeds the speech-signal level as required, with minimal impact on people—in other words, it creates optimal interference. The use of this particular generator is recommended for the meeting room in question.

Eavesdropping protection systems are designed to prevent intentional and deliberate attempts to intercept private and confidential conversations. Your information is safe: www.technika.sk

Technical measures for protecting information cover three main areas:
• detection,
• localization and removal of concealed devices;
• suppression of compromising signals from speech information;
• improvement of the room’s sound insulation.
To prevent eavesdropping using concealed devices, the room must be thoroughly “swept” before complex work is discussed. This should be done by the organization’s security-service specialists. Inviting employees of specialized organizations to such activities is undesirable.
After the sweep, the room must be sealed and access allowed only when accompanied by a security technician.
To protect the meeting room against concealed devices, the following is necessary:
check the room outside working hours for radio bugs left behind, and also monitor the situation during the confidential meeting to detect radio bugs carried on a person’s body or in their clothing, or newly installed devices;
for subsequent removal, it is necessary not only to detect a bug’s presence but also to locate it as precisely as possible;
if a bug is discovered during the meeting, it is not advisable to stop the meeting immediately and start searching for the attacker. This can create an unproductive atmosphere, cause tension and mutual suspicion among participants, and cast suspicion on an innocent person. It can also alert the attacker and prompt them to dispose of the bug. In this case, active protection measures must be applied: spatial noise masking of the room.
At the end of the meeting, the suspect must be examined directly. This requires equipment that precisely determines the location of the bug and its potential owner.
Protection against radio interference is possible by directly removing the bug or creating active radio-electronic interference within the bug’s frequency range.
Removing a bug outside meeting time is not difficult.
An attacker can obtain confidential information through windows. To prevent acoustic information leaking through laser equipment that extracts information from glass, concealed devices or directional microphones, it is recommended that the windows be covered with metallized film.
Applying the full set of organizational and technical protection measures described above will ensure an adequate level of protection for acoustic information circulating in the meeting room.

(Source: ides)

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