Are Jablotron alarm systems secure? An analysis of radio protocols and myths about hackers
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Wireless security systems are now the standard for protecting homes and businesses. However, with the advent of versatile radio frequency tools such as PandwaRF, Flipper Zero and HackRF, a question is increasingly being raised: Can these devices actually bypass and disable a modern alarm system?
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In this article, we will take a detailed look at the technical security of the popular Jablotron system, analyse how the rolling code works, explain the pairing process, and set the record straight regarding rumours that Russian hackers have cracked the protocol (pp. 1, 5).
PandwaRF Rogue Pro and Jablotron: What’s the reality?
The PandwaRF Rogue Pro device is primarily designed as an advanced tool for security specialists and auditors to carry out physical penetration testing and identify vulnerabilities in wireless devices (p. 1). But can it hack into Jablotron? The answer depends entirely on the generation of the system (p. 1).
Modern systems (Jablotron 100 / 100+ and newer)
PandwaRF Rogue Pro fails in this instance (p. 1). These systems use advanced encryption and a bidirectional dynamic code for wireless communication in the 868.1 MHz band (p. 1).
Although PandwaRF is capable of physically intercepting the frequency, the intercepted code is no longer valid (p. 1). The device is unable to decrypt the transmission in real time or generate another valid code for this specific proprietary protocol (p. 1).
Furthermore, they are centrally protected against brute-force attacks:
- Protection against jamming: If the control panel detects deliberate interference with the radio frequency band, it will immediately trigger a sabotage alarm (see p. 2).
- Brute-force protection: The control panel will interpret attempts to rapidly cycle through and guess codes as an attack and trigger an alarm (p. 1).
Older systems (Jablotron 60 / 80 Oasis)
The situation was different with the older generations sold years ago (p. 1). These models used simpler one-way communication on the 433 MHz or 868 MHz frequencies (p. 1).
Without additional protection, an advanced RF device could theoretically succeed by using replay attack methods (capturing and resending the code) or by rapidly guessing codes using specific algorithms (e.g. De Bruijn) (p. 1).
The heart of security: How does the rolling code work?
To understand why modern alarms are resistant to simple signal cloning, we need to understand the technology known as the ‘Rolling Code’ or ‘Hopping Code’ (p. 2). This is a direct defence against code-repeat attacks (p. 2).
The entire system relies on cryptographic synchronisation between the transmitter (key fob) and the receiver (control unit) (p. 2):
- A shared secret: Both devices have the same secret encryption key (Seed) and mathematical algorithm stored in their memory (p. 2).
- Internal counter: They maintain a synchronised cycle counter (e.g. value 100) (pp. 2–3).
- Code generation: When the button is pressed, the transmitter takes the counter number, combines it with the remote control ID, encrypts them using a secret key, and sends a unique string (p. 3). It then increments the counter to 101 (p. 3).
- Verification: The receiver decrypts the signal. If the counter value matches, it executes the command and sets its counter to 101 as well (para. 3). The original code becomes invalid immediately (para. 2).
What if I press the button in my pocket outside the alarm’s range?
The receiver uses what is known as a ‘Window of Opportunity’, set by default to approximately 256 to 1,000 subsequent codes (p. 3). If you press the remote control outside the range (the counter jumps to 105, for example), the control panel recognises that the code is within the safe limit, executes the command and immediately resets its counter (p. 3).
Evolution: Bi-directional Rolling Code
In the past, hackers have circumvented one-way floating-point code using RollJam attacks (signal jamming and capturing the code in a backup for later exploitation) (p. 3).
However, the modern Jablotron 100 is protected by two-way communication (p. 3). Each time a button is pressed, a rapid digital ‘Challenge-Response’ dialogue takes place (p. 3). The control panel sends a random challenge, which the remote control must correctly cryptographically sign within a fraction of a second (pp. 3, 5). Attempts to simply intercept and repeat the signal fail completely here (p. 3).
Cryptographic ‘handshake’: How does pairing work?
Pairing a new remote control with the Jablotron 100 system is a strictly controlled process that cannot be carried out ‘on a whim’ (p. 4). It requires access by a certified technician and the specialised F-Link software (p. 4).
[ Phase 1: Physical registration ]
The technician opens service mode in F-Link -> The remote control sends its Production ID to the control panel.
[ Phase 2: Cryptographic Handshake ]
The control panel and remote control generate a unique secret key (Seed) -> It is written to secure EEPROM memory.
This generated key is never transmitted over the air again (p. 4). Without knowledge of this key, no external device can respond correctly to the control panel’s challenge messages (p. 5).
Myth: Have Russian hackers cracked the Jablotron protocol?
Alarming reports occasionally appear online claiming that Russian hackers have cracked Jablotron’s protocols (p. 5). There is no public evidence or official report to confirm this (p. 5). This rumour arose from a confusion of terms and a misinterpretation of three actual facts (p. 5):
- Disconnection of cloud services in Russia (2022): Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a co-owner of Jablotron enforced sanctions and blocked cloud applications for users in Russia and Belarus (p. 5). Russian users sought ways to circumvent this block, which was misinterpreted by the public as ‘hacking the protocol’ (p. 5).
- Russian attacks on critical infrastructure: Well-known state-sponsored hacking groups (such as APT28 / Sandworm) are attacking government nodes, servers and Wi-Fi routers in Europe, not the radio protocols of local home alarm systems (p. 5).
- Mapped vulnerabilities in legacy systems: On internet forums (including Russian lockpicking forums), there are indeed guides on how to emulate the older Jablotron 60 and 80 systems, which the general public confuses with the current generation of Jablotron 100 (p. 6).
Hardware analysis: How do the experts carry out their tests?
For the purposes of reverse engineering, penetration testing or integrating older systems (Jablotron 60/80) into smart homes, researchers most commonly use the low-cost Texas Instruments CC1101 radio chip (pp. 6–7).
Hardware connection diagram (CC1101 via the SPI bus)
To carry out the analysis successfully, the chip must be connected to a microcontroller (Arduino, ESP32 or ESP8266) in accordance with the following diagram (p. 7):
| Pin name on the CC1101 | Function | Connecting to an Arduino (Uno/Nano) | Connecting to the ESP32 | Connecting to the ESP8266 (NodeMCU) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| VCC | Power supply (Strictly 3.3V!) | 3.3V | 3.3V | 3v3 |
| GND | Earthing | GND | GND | GND |
| CSN / CS | Chip Select (SPI) | Pin 10 | Pin 5 | Pin D8 (GPIO15) |
| SCK / SCLK | Serial Clock (SPI) | Pin 13 | Pin 18 | Pin D5 (GPIO14) |
| MOSI / SI | Master Out Slave In | Pin 11 | Pin 23 | Pin D7 (GPIO13) |
| MISO / SO | Master In, Slave Out | Pin 12 | Pin 19 | Pin D6 (GPIO12) |
| GDO0 | Digital output 0 | Pin 2 (data Rx/Tx) | Pin 2 | Pin D2 (GPIO4) |
| GDO2 | Digital output 2 | Pin 3 (optional) | Pin 4 | Pin D1 (GPIO5) |
⚠️ Warning: The CC1101 chip is not 5V-tolerant (p. 8). Connecting VCC to a 5V bus will immediately destroy it (p. 8). When using a 5V Arduino, a logic level shifter must be used (p. 8).
When carrying out tests, it is also crucial to select the correct hardware revision of the module (p. 8). The 433 MHz version has integrated filters adapted for the older Jablotron 60, whilst the 868 MHz / 915 MHz is essential for analysing the Jablotron 80 (Oasis), which operates at 868.5 MHz (pp. 6, 8).
Four steps in raw signal analysis (SDR Engineering)
Security analysts do not use the CC1101 chip directly to visualise invisible waves, but rather an SDR (Software-Defined Radio) receiver (e.g. RTL-SDR v4 or HackRF One), which sends raw IQ data to a computer via USB (pp. 8–9). The analysis process proceeds as follows (p. 9):
- Visual localisation (SDR++ / SDR#): The researcher sets the centre frequency and, on the so-called ‘waterfall’ display, observes the visual flash of energy when the control is pressed, thereby verifying the exact frequency and bandwidth (p. 9).
- Recording and demodulation (URH): The Universal Radio Hacker programme captures the raw signal (p. 9). With ASK/OOK modulation (Jablotron 60), the waveform appears as a series of high peaks (logic 1) and silences (logic 0) (pp. 6, 9).
- Waveform analysis (Audacity): The signal can be exported as
.wava file (p. 9). The analyser measures the pulse width in milliseconds to determine the transmission rate, identifies the preamble for synchronisation, and reads the data itself (payload) containing the device ID or battery status (p. 9). - Emulation: Once the exact structure and length of the pulses have been determined (e.g. 32-bit code), the parameters are entered into a test tool capable of communicating natively with the old system in question (pp. 9–10).
Conclusion
Whilst the older Jablotron 60 and 80 systems are now outdated in terms of radio security and their transmissions can be fully decrypted, the current generation Jablotron 100 provides state-of-the-art protection (pp. 1, 6–7). Thanks to two-way rolling code, encryption and active jamming detection, it remains immune to commonly available hacking tools such as PandwaRF and Flipper Zero (pp. 1–3).










